We study efficient, Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in a social choice setting that allows for informational and allocative externalities. We show that such mechanisms exist only if a congruence condition relating private and social rates of information substitution is satisfied. If signals are multidimensional, the congruence condition is determined by an integrability constraint, and it can hold only in non-generic cases such as the private value case or the symmetric case. If signals are one-dimensional, the congruence condition reduces to a monotonicity constraint and it can be generically satisfied.
Introduction
There exists an extensive literature on efficient auctions and mechanism design. A lot of attention has been devoted to the case where each agent i has a quasi-linear utility function that depends on the chosen social alternative, on information (or signal) privately known to i, and on a monetary transfer, but does not depend on information available to other agents. In this framework, a prominent role is played by the Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (CGV) mechanisms (see Clarke, 1971 , Groves, 1973 , Vickrey, 1961 . These are mechanisms that ensure both that an efficient decision is taken and that truthful revelation of privately held information is a dominant strategy for each agent. This result holds for arbitrary dimensions of signal spaces and for arbitrary signals' distributions 1 . In this paper we study the case where each agent has a quasi-linear utility function having as arguments the signals received by all agents and the chosen social alternative. Hence, besides allocative externalities, we allow for informational externalities, and we speak of "interdependent valuations". Signals may be multi-dimensional, but we assume that they are independently drawn across agents. (Signal independence is the most seriously restrictive assumption; observe though that this assumption is not required for the result in the one-dimensional case of Section 5.)
Interdependent valuations naturally appear in many (two-stage) games studied in applications. In those applications the role of the social alternatives is played by possible allocations of property rights (such as licenses, patents, control rights over firms, etc...) at stage one. These allocations influence then the interaction among agents at stage two. For example, consider an oligopoly model with n firms producing an homogenous good. Each firm i is characterized by a vector of parameters c . Assume now that an innovation appears such that a firm licensed to use the innovation will be characterized by a new vector c i , which is private information. A social alternative can be described by the set L of licensed firms. The valuation of firm i for alternative L is given by the change in profits relative to status-quo:
0 ). Note how firm i 0 s valuation depends both on who else is licensed (allocative externalities), and on information available to other firms 2 . Our model can be applied to the study of multi-object auctions. There are many auction papers that go beyond the private values case (e.g., the literature following Milgrom and Weber, 1982) , but almost all of them restrict attention to situations where there is one object (or there are several identical units), signals are one-dimensional, agents are ex-ante symmetric and do not care about what other agents receive at the auction 3 . Applications of the present model to auctions allow for several heterogenous objects, asymmetries among bidders, and both allocative and informational externalities 4 . In the social choice framework considered here, Williams and Radner (1988) have shown that, in general, no efficient, dominant-strategy incentive compatible mechanisms exist 5 . Important insights about auctions with informationally interdependent valuations (but without allocative externalities) can be found in Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta and Maskin (1998) . Maskin (1992) considers an auction for an indivisible object and observes that no efficient, incentive-compatible auction exists if a buyer's valuation for that object depends on a multi-dimensional signal (see further comments on this result in Section 4 below). Dasgupta and Maskin (1998) study multi-object auctions where agents have one-dimensional signals and where there are no allocative externalities. They construct a mechanism that achieves efficient allocations (under appropriate conditions on marginal valuations). Ausubel 2 The private information held by each firm is typically multidimensional, since it includes information about fixed costs, marginal costs, etc... Since fixed and marginal costs do not affect competition in the same way, they cannot be reduced to a one-dimensional parameter without loss of generality. If several types of licenses were sold, the private information would include cost parameters for each type of license thus increasing the dimensionality of the signal space even further.
3 Auction models emphasizing the role of allocative externalities in a one-object setup are discussed in and Stacchetti (1996, 1999) .
4 These features will, in general, give rise to multidimensional signal spaces, since the payoff-relevant part of the signal varies with the chosen alternative (e.g., with the acquired bundle or with the entire distribution of objects among agents).
5 Cremer and McLean (1985,1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992) have given conditions under which a principal can extract the full surplus available when types are correlated. Full extraction mechanisms are, in particular, efficient. Neeman (1998) shows that these results do not hold in a model that can be interpreted as one where agents have multidimensional signals, and signals have some private and some common components. Aoyagi (1998) presents a general existence result of efficient, budget balanced and incentive compatible mechanisms when agents have finitely many correlated types. None of the above papers covers the present framework ( i.e., a continuum of mutually payoff relevant multidimensional types), but we suspect that correlation among types allows some possibility results. On the other hand, the mechanisms displayed in the literature above are not very intuitive and require potentially unlimited transfers.
(1997) and Perry and Reny (1998) present specific bidding procedures that achieve efficient allocations for a one-dimensional model with M identical units and no allocative externalities. Ausubel assumes symmetry among bidders and constant marginal valuations. Perry and Reny drop symmetry and allow for decreasing marginal valuations. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the social choice model. In Section 3 we obtain a characterization theorem for Bayesian incentive compatible direct mechanisms. In Section 4 we exhibit impossibility results about efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms. We only require value maximization, and we completely ignore budget-balancedness and any other properties. Hence, we show that providing incentives for truthful revelation of privately held information is not compatible even with a very weak efficiency requirement.
The logic behind the impossibility results is as follows: An incentive compatible mechanism generates for agent i a (convex) equilibrium expected utility function V i (·) : S i → < , where S i is the multidimensional type space of that agent. By a well-known calculus result (Schwarz's Theorem), the cross-derivatives of such functions are equal 6 . This requirement implies several equalities involving the conditional expected probabilities with which the various alternatives must be chosen in incentive compatible mechanisms (these expected probabilities form the gradient of V i (·)) 7 . The impossibility results follow by showing that the conditional expected probabilities generated by efficient mechanisms satisfy the required equalities only under very restrictive conditions. The first result is obtained for situations where incentive compatibility implies that an informational variable has a zero marginal effect on some of the conditional expected probabilities, while this variable is relevant for efficiency considerations. Theorem ?? shows impossibility for the case where there is at least one agent possessing essential information that affects other agents, but does not directly affect the owner of that information. A similar argument is used in Example ?? which shows that efficient, incentive compatible mechanisms may not exist if there exist an alternative k and an agent i such that agent i´s signal affecting her valuation for alternative k is multidimensional (this corresponds to Maskin's (1992) example).
Our main impossibility result is Theorem ?? (which is significantly different from Maskin's example and from other impossibility theorems iden-6 This is the mathematical statement of the pretty obvious fact that the net height covered by climbing a mountain is independent of the path of ascent.
7 A very similar phenomenon appears in the classical demand theory for several goods (see Chapter 3 in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995) : the matrix of price derivatives for a demand function arising from utility maximization must be symmetric. tified so far). We consider there a framework where each agent i has a K−dimensional signal s i . The coordinate s i k is a one-dimensional signal affecting the valuations of all agents for alternative k. This framework is critical since, a-priori, all informational variables may have a non-zero marginal effect on the conditional expected probabilities generated by incentive compatible mechanisms, and we cannot use the method sketched above. The argument showing impossibility is now more refined: the conditional expected probabilities generated by an efficient mechanism satisfy the conditions implied by the equality of the cross derivatives only if a congruence condition relating private and social rates of informational substitution is satisfied. The congruence condition holds only for a closed, zero-measure set of parameters 8 . Since the constraints imposed by Schwarz's Theorem apply as soon as signals are multidimensional, results similar to Theorem ?? hold as soon as there is at least one agent whose signal is of dimension d ≥ 2. In Section 5 we study the remaining case where the signal spaces of all agents are onedimensional. For that case we construct a mechanism that is efficient and incentive compatible if a monotonicity condition on marginal valuations is satisfied. Our treatment is based on the idea (which can be traced back to Pigou) that transfers should stand for the cumulative effect of one's action (here a signal report) on all other agents. The first illustration of this idea in an auction context with interdependent valuations appears in Dasgupta and Maskin (1998) .
The expected equilibrium utility functions V i (·) depend here on a realvalued signal, and there are no cross-derivatives to consider. The implementability condition reduces to a monotonicity constraint that can be satisfied in non-trivial cases.
Concluding comments are gathered in Section 6. In particular, we comment on the difficulty of finding constrained efficient (i.e., second-best) mechanisms.
The Model
There are K social alternatives, indexed by k = 1, ...K and there are N agents, indexed by i = 1, .., N. 
An Application to Auctions
Consider an auction where a set M of heterogenous objects is divided among n + 1 agents (agent zero is the seller, the rest are potential buyers). An alternative is a partition
, where M i is the set of objects allocated to bidder i, i = 1, 2, ...N and M 0 is the set of unsold objects. Bidder i 0 s piece of information s i µj summarizes, from the point of view of i, the important aspects for j (say, attributes of the objects in M j ) given partition µ.
This framework allows for informational and allocative externalities and for asymmetric bidders. Particularly simple cases are: 1) The private values case where V 
Direct Revelation Mechanisms
By the revelation principle, we can restrict attention to direct, incentive compatible mechanisms. We first define Direct Revelation Mechanisms and then turn to incentive compatibility.
Let S denote the Cartesian product
as the type space of agents other than i, with s −i as generic element.
9 We address below (see Example 4.3) situations where the signal of an agent i affecting the utility of agent j in alternative k is itself multidimensional.
10 Convexity is assumed for convenience. If S i is simply connected all results go through unchanged.
11 The analysis directly extends to the case where the valuation functions include also a constant, i.e.,
A direct revelation mechanism (DRM) is defined by a pair (p, x) where p is a social choice rule, and x : S → < N is a payment scheme. The term p k (s) is the probability that alternative k is chosen if the agents report signals s = (s 1 , ..., s N ), and x i (s) is the transfer to agent i if the agents report signals s. A DRM is efficient if the associated social choice rule is efficient 12 . Given a payment scheme x and a social choice rule p, we now define for each agent i the conditional expected payment function y i : S i → < and the conditional expected probability assignment functions q i :
associated with x and p :
Assume that agent i believes that all other agents report truthfully and assume that i reports type t i when his true type is s i . Then, i 0 s expected utility is given by:
Define also
12 We ignore here (as in the CGV approach) the (ex post) "budget balancedness" condition, which imposes P i x i (s) ≤ 0, ∀s. In other words, we abstract from efficiency losses due to potential external subsidies.
Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
A DRM is (Bayes-Nash) incentive compatible if:
For the characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms we need two definitions.
A (possibly multivalued) mapping Ψ :
Conservativeness is a necessary and sufficient condition for Ω to be the gradient of a function ω :
be the associated conditional probability assignments. For each agent i, let Q i (s i ) : < K×N → < K×N be the vector field, where, for each alternative k, the ki th coordinate is given by a i ki q i k (s i ) and the kj th coordinate, j 6 = i, is zero. Then (p, x) is incentive compatible if and only if the following conditions hold:
1. ∀i, the vector field Q i (·) is monotone and conservative.
∀i, ∀s
See Appendix.
Impossibility Results
In an incentive compatible mechanism (p, x) we have
is convex (see the proof of Theorem ??), and hence twice differentiable almost everywhere. Assuming that V i (·) is differentiable at s i we obtain by the Envelope Theorem that:
13 Note the analogy with the classical "law of demand". 14 The integral can be defined on any path connecting t i and s i since the vector field Q i (·) is conservative. For example, we can choose a straight line, to obtain
.dα 15 Note that the Theorem implies a "Revenue Equivalence" result. The conditional expected payment of agent i in any incentive compatible mechanism is solely a function of the associated expected probability assignment, and of the expected utility of an arbitrary type. Any two incentive compatible mechanisms with the same probability assignment yield, up to a constant, the same conditional expected payments. ∀k, ∀j 6 = i,
Assuming that V i (·) is twice continuously differentiable at s i , we obtain by Schwarz's Theorem that the cross-derivatives at s i must be equal. This implies :
The idea behind the following impossibility results is to check whether efficient mechanisms yield conditional expected probability assignment functions that satisfy conditions ?? and ??.
Note that an efficient SCR is piece-wise constant. Hence, for efficient mechanisms we obtain that the associated functions {q i (·)} n i=1 are everywhere continuously differentiable by assuming, for example, that the (convex) type spaces have a non-empty interior and a piece-wise smooth boundary, and that for all i and all s i ∈ S i , f i (s i ) > 0. We first focus on the simpler condition ??. Letp be an efficient SCR, and let {q
be the associated conditional expected probability assignments. The variableŝ i kj is said to be essential if there exist s i , t i ∈ S i such that:
Note that unless alternative k is always welfare-dominated (or always welfare superior) or the density f i (·) is degenerate (i.e., does not have fulldimensionality), all variablesŝ i kj such that a i kj 6 = 0 are essential 16 . Assume that i, j, k exist such that i 6 = j, a i ki 6 = 0, andŝ i kj is essential. Then efficient, incentive compatible DRMs do not exist. Let s i , t i satisfy the conditions in Definition ??, let (p, x) be an efficient, incentive-compatible DRM with associated conditional expected probability assignments
. By efficiency, we must have
Since a i ki 6 = 0, we obtain by equation ?? and by the construction of
, we obtain a contradiction.
We next show that the simple phenomenon displayed in Theorem ?? has a deeper consequence. So far we have assumed thatŝ i kj , agent i 0 s piece of information affecting the utility of agent j in alternative k, is one-dimensional. We next look at an example where this requirement is not satisfied. An impossibility result in such situations has been observed by Maskin (1992) . What we show here is that Maskin's result is a consequence of the phenomenon displayed in Theorem ??.
There are two agents i = 1, 2 and two alternatives k = A, B. Signals are two-dimensional, Consider the change of variables:
In the t i type space we obtain:
2 ) = 0. Hence, agent 1 has a signal t 1 2 which does not affect her utility (in particular it does not affect her utility in alternative A), but affects the utility of agent 2 in alternative B. In incentive compatible mechanisms we obtain by condition ?? that agent 1's interim expected probability for alternative A is independent of t . Even when the dependence of an agent's valuation on the signal of another agent is very small (i.e., b is very close to zero), efficiency cannot be attained.
Our results so far suggest that, in order to obtain generic existence of efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms, it is necessary that ∀i, j, i 6 = j, ∀k, s Hence, we now look at K− dimensional type-spaces, and we denote by s i k agent i's one-dimensional piece of information affecting (possibly in different ways) the utility of all agents in alternative k.
In this setup, the impossibility of efficient, incentive compatible mechanisms is less immediate. The question is whether the conditional expected probability assignment functions generated by efficient mechanisms satisfy the more complex condition ??.
To be precise, recall that we have derived conditions 4.3 and 4.4 for
, we obtain by conditions 4.3 and 4.4 that:
The equality of cross-derivatives implies that :
In order to simplify notation, we drop from now on the "tilde" and denote
, and equilibrium utility V i (·). Assume that (p, x) is an efficient DRM that is incentive compatible for agent i. Let k, k 0 be any pair of alternatives such that: 1) a i k 0 i 6 = 0 ; 2) There exists a type
. Then it must be the case that
See Appendix 19 . Condition ?? is a congruence requirement between private and social rates of information substitution (see Example below for more intuition about 
Assume that an efficient, incentive compatible DRM exists, and denote it by (p, x). Let q i k (·) denote i 0 s interim expected probability that the mechanism chooses alternative k.
We will first show that, as a consequence of equation ??, incentive compatible mechanisms must yield the same vector of conditional expected probability assignments for types of agent i, i = 1, 2, lying on lines with slope
We next show that efficient mechanism yield the same vector of conditional expected probability assignments for types lying on lines with slope
. Hence, incentive compatibility can be consistent with efficiency only if these two slopes are equal.
We know that
Consider agent 1. Equation ?? yields
By taking the derivative with respect to s 
Hence, in incentive compatible mechanisms the function q We now turn to the consequences of efficiency. Alternative A is chosen by an efficient DRM at reports (
This is equivalent to:
Efficiency implies that: 
Equations ?? and ?? yield together:
The same reasoning yields an analogous condition for i = 2. Two remarks regarding Theorem ?? follow. Technically, Theorem ?? applies to the case where the dimensionality of signal spaces coincides with the number of alternatives K ≥ 2. But it should be clear that the same type of results can be obtained whenever the integrability constraint expressed by the equality of cross-derivatives bites (i.e., whenever, for at least one agent, the dimensionality of the signal space is greater than one.) For signal spaces of any dimension d, 1 < d ≤ K, efficiency and incentive compatibility imply together algebraic conditions on the parameters (analogous to condition ??) that cannot be generically satisfied. An illustration is offered in Example ?? in the Appendix. Dasgupta and Maskin (1998) suggest that the "second best" mechanism for a multidimensional model can be analyzed by performing a reduction to a one-dimensional model for which an efficient mechanism can be sometimes constructed (see next Section). The constructed mechanism is then "constrained efficient" for the original multidimensional model. Simple dimension reductions are indeed available in two cases: 1) The only integrability constraints are of the form given by condition ??, which implies that incentive compatible mechanisms cannot condition on a variableŝ In Example ?? we have exhibited the lines along which conditional expected probability assignments in an incentive compatible mechanism must be constant (and hence we have exhibited the appropriate reduction to one dimension 21 ). If at least one agent perceives more than two payoff relevant alternatives 22 , the constraints expressed by conditions ?? simultaneously affect several functions, and further dimension reductions become endogenous and impossible to perform a-priori.
The above analysis sheds some light on the outcome of a multi-object auction where the objects and the agents are heterogenous in a non-trivial way. If there are informational externalities, and if signals are independent, whatever sale mechanism is considered (including mechanisms that allow for "combinatorial" bidding), efficiency cannot be achieved.
One-Dimensional Signals
We now assume that agents have one-dimensional signals. Agent i's payoff in alternative k is given by
where s j ∈ [s j , s j ] denotes the one-dimensional signal of agent j. Signals need not be independently distributed, and the result below does not depend on the signals' distribution functions.
In order to avoid a tedious case differentiation, we assume that, for each agent i, there are no alternatives k , k 0 , k 0 6 = k, such that a i ki = a i k 0 i . Our result will rely on the following assumption:
Condition ?? (referred below as the weak congruence condition) requires that the sequence of alternatives obtained by ordering (in terms of magnitude) the impacts of i's signal on i's payoff is the same as the sequence obtained by ordering the impacts of i 0 s signal on total welfare. Note the analogy with condition ??, but note also the gained slack in the one-dimensional framework. This slack (i.e., required inequalities instead of equalities) allows the condition to be satisfied for an open set of parameters' values.
Assume that the weak congruence condition ?? is satisfied. Then there exists an efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism. Moreover, the associated transfers do not depend on the distribution of signals 23 . See Appendix.
Conclusions
We have shown that efficient, incentive compatible mechanisms can exist only if a congruence condition relating private and social rates of information 23 A similar result appears in Dasgupta and Maskin (1998) , who were the first to exhibit the basic intuition behind the construction. Technically, our result is not a special case of theirs because Dasgupta and Maskin's framework is, specifically, one of multi-object auctions (without allocative externalities), while we study a general social choice problem. Dasgupta and Maskin's mechanism is more complex since it also elicits reports about valuation functions.
The general condition allowing implementation (condition ??) was first identified in an earlier version of this paper. substitution is satisfied. If signals are multi-dimensional, the congruence condition is determined by an integrability constraint, and it can be satisfied only in non-generic cases such as the private value case or the symmetric case. If signals are one-dimensional, the congruence condition reduces to a monotonicity constraint and it can be generically satisfied.
Our impossibility theorems can be extended to more general specifications of quasi-linear valuation functions -the integrability constraints expressed by the equality of cross-derivatives will not generally agree with the requirements imposed by efficiency. We have chosen the linear formulation for ease of exposition, and because it yields nice properties of equilibrium utility functions without further assumptions on the used mechanisms (see Section 3).
The impossibility results in the multi-dimensional case suggest a quest for the second-best (or constrained efficient) mechanisms. It is straightforward to construct second-best mechanisms if the inefficiency is purely due to the fact that some informational variables must have a zero marginal effect on the expected probability assignment in incentive compatible mechanisms. It is then possible to reduce the dimensionality of the model (without loss of efficiency) by eliminating such variables. If, after performing these reductions, it is still the case that the payoff-relevant information depends in a non-trivial way on the chosen alternative (as it is the case, say, in a general multi-object auction), we are left in a framework covered by Theorem ?? and further dimension reductions become endogenous. The construction of a second-best mechanism is then equivalent to the difficult problem of finding a monotone and conservative vector field that maximizes the (expected) welfare functional 24 . This will be the subject of future work.
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We obtain the following chain of equalities:
The first equality follows by equation ?? and by the definition of V i (·). The second equality follows by assumption. The last equality follows by choosing to perform the integration on the straight line connecting t i and
It is enough to show that the integrand is non-negative for any α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. For α = 0, the claim is obvious. Assume that α > 0. We can write:
We now obtain:
The last inequality follows from the monotonicity of Q i (·). b) For the converse, assume that the DRM (p, x) is incentive compatible. This implies that
is the supremum of a collection of affine functions and it must be convex. Convex functions are twice differentiable almost everywhere 25 . The convexity of V i (·) implies the monotonicity of the subdifferential map ∂V i (s i ). At all points where V i (·) is differentiable (i.e., a.e.) the subdifferential ∂V i (·) consists of a unique point, the gradient ∇V i (·). Hence, the function ∇V i (·) is well-defined, monotone and differentiable a.e. Assuming that V i (·) is differentiable at s i we obtain by expression 3.1 and by the Envelope Theorem that:
Hence, we obtain ∇V i (s i ) = Q i (s i ) whenever the gradient is well-defined (a.e.). The integral representation is immediately obtained from the fundamental theorem of calculus if V i (·) is everywhere differentiable. Otherwise, the result follows by noting that a convex function is (up to a constant) uniquely determined by its subdifferential (see Rockafellar 1997, Theorem 24.9) , and that it can be recovered (up to a constant) by integrating any measurable selection from its subdifferential map (see Krishna and Maenner, 1999) . 
Since p is efficient, we obtain:
where
An analogous expression holds for q i k 0 (s i ). Define now the set
We will show that the derivative
involves only an integral over
by the "rate of change" of this set with respect to s i k 0 , which is given by −(
). To see this, consider an affine, bijective change of variable in the space S −i , where
0 is one of the new variables, and s −i,x 0 denotes the set of the other variables. Such a change of variables exists because x 0 is not identically equal to zero (since q i k (t i ) 6 = 0 and q i k 0 (t i ) 6 = 0). The explicit change of variable may depend on the coefficients.
To fix ideas, suppose that the coefficients are such that for all alternatives k 00 there exists an agent j(k 00 ) 6 = i, such that a j(k 00 ) k 00 j(k 00 ) 6 = 0. Consider then the mapping {s j k 00 } j6 =i,k 00 → {x j k 00 } j6 =i,k 00 where: 1) For k 00 6 = k, j = j(k 00 ),
; 2) For all (j, k 00 ) such that k 00 = k or j 6 = j(k 00 ), x j k 00 = s j k 00 . Denote by J(s −i ) the Jacobian induced by this change of variable. Recalling expression ??, observe that
Note that variables x 0 and s i k 0 appear only in the first inequality defining ∆ k (s i ). Moreover, the area in ∆ k (s i ) where marginal variations of s i k 0 are relevant (i.e., where
. Hence, recalling expression ??, we obtain:
The term
Combining equations ?? and ?? , we obtain that: 
By Schwarz's Theorem we obtain:
We now turn to the consequences of efficiency. Define the sets ∆ k (s i ), 
To see this observe that
, r = 1, 2}. The formula follows because, when s , r = 1, 2 (they corresponds to Ω Ar,B (s i ), r = 1, 2, respectively) Combining the above expressions, we conclude that efficiency implies:
Finally, note that conditions ??and ?? are, in general, inconsistent.
Proof of Theorem ??: Since all a i ki are assumed to be different, we can re-order the alternatives so that the sequence (a i ki ) k is strictly increasing, i.e. a i (k+1)i > a i ki for k = 1, .., K − 1. Condition ?? implies then that the sequence ( P n j=1 a i kj ) k is also strictly increasing. We construct an efficient, incentive compatible, DRM. For any reported signals the mechanism chooses an efficient alternative given those reports. To specify transfers, we proceed as follows. For fixed reports s −i and i's report t i ,denote by k * (t i ) the efficient alternative chosen as a function of t i , i.e.
Because the sequence ( P n j=1 a i kj ) k is also strictly increasing , we can define for every vector s −i , a non-decreasing sequence of agent i's signals (s i,k (s −i )) k with the property that, for any t i ∈ (s i,k (s −i ), s i,k+1 (s −i )), the efficient alternative is k * (t i ) = k. For each vector s −i we inductively define a sequence of transfers, {x k i (s −i )} k , as follows: x 1 i (s −i ) ∈ < is an arbitrary constant, and for all k, 1 < k ≤ K −1,
If the vector of reports is (t i , s −i ), then i's transfer is defined to be Note that the transfers defined above do not depend on the distribution of signals, and our mechanism implements the efficient social choice rule no matter how the signals of the various agents are distributed 27 27 In other words, truth-telling constitutes an ex-post equilibrium.
